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Contracts: Allocating Decisional Authority Over
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INTRODUCTION

On May 7, 1998, the New York Court of Appeals, in a landmark
decision, ruled on the legal status of dispositional authority agreements regarding frozen, stored human embryos.' Advances in medical technology, especially with regard to in vitro fertilization (IVF),
have created medical facts that have far outstripped the development
of legal doctrines to address them. Infertility research and reproductive technology have spawned medical miracles that now permit infertile couples to achieve a genetic, biological connection with their
offspring through non-coital reproduction.

Associate Professor of Law, Baruch College/City University of New York, New
York, NewYork. B.C.L., McGill University, 1973; LL.B., McGill University, 1974.
See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998). The New York Times, recognizing
the significance of this decision, immediately reported the case. See Raymond Hernandez, Court Blocks Use of Embryos Without Ex-Husband's Consent, N.Y. TIMES, May 8,
1998, at B3.
2 For a discussion of the problems created as a result of the
dichotomy between
medical facts and its status in the law, see generally Lori B. Andrews, Legal Status of
the Embryo, 32 LOY. L. REV. 357 (1986); Mark Curriden, Frozen Embryos: New Frontier,
75 A.B.A. J. 68 (1989); Elisa K. Poole, Allocation of Decision-MakingRights to Frozen Embryos, 4 AM. J. FAM. L. 67 (1990); John A. Robertson, DecisionalAuthority over Embryos
and Control of IVF Technology, 28 JURIMETRICSJ. 285 (1988) [hereinafter Robertson,
DecisionalAuthority]; John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families and ProcreativeLiberty: The
Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939 (1986) [hereinafter
Robertson, Embryos, Families]; John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: Legal Status of
Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437 (1990) [hereinafter Robertson, In the Beginning];
John A. Robertson, PriorAgreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. L.J.
407 (1990) [hereinafter Robertson, Prior Agreements]; John A. Robertson, Technology
and Motherhood: Legal and Ethical Issues in Human Egg Donation, 59 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1 (1989); Marcia Joy Wurmbrand, Frozen Embryos: Moral, Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079 (1986); Tanya Feliciano, Note, Davis v. Davis: Wat
About FutureDisputes?, 26 CONN. L. REV. 305 (1993); MarioJ. Trespalacios, Comment,
Frozen Embryos: Towards an Equitable Solution, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 803 (1992).
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The IVF procedure generally begins with hormonal stimulation
of a woman's ovaries to produce multiple eggs or ova.3 Eggs retrieved in this manner are then combined with sperm in a petri dish.
At this point fertilization occurs, resulting in a zygote that then begins to divide.5 Eventually, the zygote or embryo6 may be transferred
to the uterus through a cervical catheter. A successful procedure entails implantation in the uterine lining and a subsequent pregnancy.8
Cryopreservation is a technique that allows eggs, removed by laparoscopy or ultrasound needle aspiration, and zygotes to be preserved indefinitely for later attempts at implantation." This technique permits storage of any "unused" products and allows for not
only a reduction of physical stress for the female but a significant savings in medical expenses as well. At the same time, however, cryopreservation of the spare embryos creates a fertile source for later
disagreements.
The fate of unused, cryopreserved embryos has created much
controversy. The process is not controversial when only the eggs intended for immediate implantation are retrieved. In those instances,
thorny issues regarding storage and discard policies of unused eggs
are generally avoided. Those IVF clinics that choose, however, to
take advantage of medical developments and use stored, excess fertilized eggs for subsequent implantation will typically enter into a formal written agreement with the infertile couple.'0 That document
recites the relative rights of the biological donors vis a vis the couple
and the IVF program. A couple is offered the opportunity to express
their joint decision, as a single entity, with regard to the disposition
of any unused embryos. Selection is made from a gamut of choices
including discard, donation to a childless couple, or donation to the
IVF facility for research purposes upon the future occurrence of
stated contingencies. Encompassed within the listed events to trigger

3 See Feliciano, supra note 2, at 307.
4 See id.
5 See id.
6 The term "embryo" is referred to as the point at which
"the inner cell mass [of
the zygote] reorganizes into two layers that make up the embryonic disc" and has
become "well established in the uterine wall." Robertson, In the Beginning, supra

note 2, at 442.
7 See Feliciano, supra note 2, at 308.
8 See id.
9 See id.
10 See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 176 (N.Y. 1998). The document in the

Kass case in New York is a fair prototype of such informed consent agreements between an infertile couple and an in vitro fertilization (IVF) program. See id.

1999)

FROZENEMBRYOS

939

a couple's selection are death, divorce, refusal to continue with the
program, or termination of the agreement.
How does one assess the respective rights of the biological donors and the IVF program? What happens to the stored embryos
when either the couple or one party thereof changes the earlier joint
decision as expressed in the agreement? Does the potential delay
caused by the time gap between fertilization and implantation create
an insoluble legal quandary? Who should exercise authority and/or
ownership over the embryo? Which institution - the legislature, the
courts, or private agreement - is best suited for the resolution of this
seemingly insurmountable legal debate?
The New York Court of Appeals addressed these issues in Kass v.
Kass." For the first time in the state of New York, and possibly the
nation, the court clarified two critical issues.'2 First, the court held
that a written contract executed between an infertile couple and an
JVF facility, is enforceable in a court of law.'" Second, the court held
that the provisions included in such contracts, although intended as
an expression of the couple's wishes vis a vis the IVF program, would
also govern the couple inter se.' 4 The court of appeals arrived at this
conclusion despite evidence that the document had never been intended, either at the time of its drafting or at its execution, to govern
the couple's actions between one another. 5 Thus, the contract that
originally provided the basis for a legal relationship between the
couple and the infertility clinic may now also serve to allocate the
scope of decision-making between the partners.
Part I of this Article will discuss both the appellate division and
the court of appeals decisions in Kass. Part II will compare the New
York ruling with the decision rendered in the Tennessee case of
Davis v. Davis.'6 Part III will examine the policy implications of these
rulings. Finally, this Article will consider various models for resolution of this ethical issue and will propose that the reasoning of the
court of appeals in Kass be adopted as the optimum method for resolving disputes between the biological donors, as well as advancing
the most equitable results for all concerned parties.

11 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
12

Prior to the Kass decision, no jurisdiction has held a contract dispositive of the

parties' rights of control over cryopreserved fertilized eggs.
13 See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180.
14 See id. at 181
15 See
id.
16 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
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KASS V. KASS

Maureen and Steve Kass turned to an IVF program after their efforts at conception through artificial insemination failed.1 7 Five embryos, created during the marriage, were being stored in the IVF
bank. 8 The Kasses, now divorced, disputed custody of these frozen,
stored embryos.' Mrs. Kass claimed sole custody for implantation in
the belief that the embryos represented her last remaining opportunity for genetic motherhood. 0 Mr. Kass objected to such a transfer
of custody and argued that the burden of unwanted fatherhood
2
should not be imposed on him unilaterally without his consent. '
The Kasses had signed an informed consent instrument with the
lVF program in which they (1) authorized the retrieval of the eggs
and (2) indicated their agreement to cryopreservation of any unused
eggs.2" A signed addendum to the consent form detailed the risks as
well as the benefits of the IVF procedure. 3 They further specified
that, in the event they were unable to make a decision regarding the
disposition of the embryos, they would donate them to the IVF program for research purposes. 24
17 SeeKassv. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 583 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997).
18
'9

20
21

See id. at
See id. at
See id. at
See id. at

584.

585.
593 (Friedmann,J., concurring).
585.

22 See id. at 583-84.

23 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 583-84.
24

See id. at 584. The relevant portions of the contract are as follows:
We understand that our frozen pre-zygotes will be stored for a
maximum of 5 years ...

Our frozen pre-zygotes will not be re-

leased from storage without the written consent of both of us,
consistent with the policies of the IVF Program and applicable
law. In the event of divorce, we understand that legal ownership
of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a property settlement and will be released as directed by order of a court of
competent jurisdiction. Should we for any reason no longer wish
to attempt to initiate a pregnancy, we understand that we may determine the disposition of our frozen pre-zygotes remaining in
storage. The possibility of our death or any other unforeseen circumstances that may result in neither of us being able to determine the disposition of any stored frozen pre-zygotes requires that we now indicate our
wishes...
Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 176 (N.Y. 1998) (emphasis added). The second part of
the contract, entitled "INFORMED CONSENT FORM NO. 2 - ADDENDUM NO.
2-1: CRYOPRESERVATION-STATEMENT OF DISPOSITION," states:
We understand that it is IVF Program Policy to obtain our informed
consent to the number of pre-zygotes which are to be cryopreserved
and to the disposition of excess cryopreserved pre-zygotes. We are to
indicate our choices by signing our initials where noted below ....
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Although the laparoscopic procedure resulted in the retrieval of
sixteen eggs, the procedure resulted in only nine embryos or zyKass's sister, who
gotes. 25 Four of the eggs were transferred Sto 2Mrs.
6
had initially volunteered to act as a surrogate. The remaining five
ova were cryopreserved. 7 Within three weeks of the procedure, having failed to become pregnant, the sister declined to act as a surrogate.
Following these unsuccessful attempts at pregnancy, the
Kasses decided to divorce, ultimately signing an "uncontested divorce" agreement typed by Mrs. Kass.2 That agreement referred specifically to the five frozen embryos and directed that the embryos be
disposed of in accordance with their previous agreement with the IVF
clinic. 0
Mrs. Kass subsequently informed her IVF doctor and the hospital of her marital problems and asserted her opposition to either the
destruction or the release of these embryos.3 ' Subsequently, as part
of their divorce proceeding, Mrs. Kass requested sole custody of the
zygotes.32 Mr. Kass counterclaimed for specific performance of the
parties' executed agreement with the IVF program." Within a few
months, the couple had settled all issues in their matrimonial action,
with the exception of each party's claim to the five frozen zygotes. 4 A
divorce judgment was entered with the proviso that this aspect of custody be left forjudicial determination.
2. In the event that we no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy,
or are unable to make a decision regarding the disposition of
our stored, frozen pre-zygotes, we now indicate our desire for
the disposition of our pre-zygotes and direct the IVF program to
(choose one)....
(b) Our frozen pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF Program for biological studies and be disposed of by the IVF Program for approved research investigation as determined by the
lVF Program.
Id. at 176-77.
25 See Kass, 696 N.E.2d
at 177.
26 See
id.
27 See
id.
28

See id.

See id.
soSee id. The specific language of the document reads: "The disposition of the
frozen 5 pre-zygotes at Mather Hospital is that they should be disposed of [in] the
manner outlined in our consent form and that neither Maureen Kass, Steve Kass or anyone
else will lay claim to custody of these pre-zygotes." Id. (emphasis added).
31 See Kass, 696 N.E.2d
at 177.
32 See
id.
33 See
id.
3
See id.
35 See id.
2
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The trial court awarded sole custody of the frozen embryos to
Mrs. Kass and ruled that she be given exclusive decisional authority
over them. 6 The appellate division reversed. All five justices were
unanimous on two points. First, the justices declared that a woman's
right to privacy and bodily integrity are not implicated before the
implantation stage.3 7 Secondly, the court ruled that, when parties enter into a joint agreement with an IVF program and therein determine the disposition of unused embryos, that agreement is enforceable and governs their behavior.3 8 The justices were divided,
however, as to whether this particular agreement between the Kasses
and the IVF program was sufficiently clear and definitive to bind the
parties. 39 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division's decision. The court reversed the portion of the earlier ruling
that found the consent form to be unclear and rested the decision
exclusively on the legal consequences of an enforceable contract and
its provisions. 40

See id.
See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). After discussing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976),
the majority stated:
A woman's established right to exercise virtually exclusive control over
her own body is not implicated in the IVF scenario until such time as
implantation actually occurs, for it is only then that her bodily integrity
is at issue. Prior to implantation that interest is not a relevant and appropriate consideration ....
Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 586 (citations omitted).
Similarly, the dissent stated: "My colleagues and I are in unanimous agreement
with regard to two major issues. First, that the Supreme Court erred in equating a
woman's procreation right to attain pregnancy via in vitro fertilization with her right
to bodily autonomy attendant to an in vivo pregnancy." Id. at 594 (Miller, J., dissenting).
See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 587. Indeed, the majority stated, "We are in full
agreement with the decision in Davis to the extent it requires that where a manifestation of mutual intent exists between the parties, that intent must be given effect by
the court." Id. The dissent agreed, stating that "where the parties have expressed
their agreement by contract, their intentions should control and that such agreements should be encouraged if not mandated." Id. at 594 (Miller, J., dissenting).
39 See id. at 589 ("[E]ven if one provision of the informed
consent document
could rationally be perceived as creating an ambiguity ... any such ambiguity may
be resolved by reading that document as a whole to determine its purpose and intent."); see also id. at 594 (Miller J., dissenting) ("[A]lthough the parties did enter
into an 'informed consent' agreement, it failed to provide an unambiguous statement of their intent.").
40 See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178 ("We now affirm, agreeing
with the plurality that
the parties clearly expressed their intent that in the circumstances presented the
pre-zygotes would be donated to the IVF program for research purposes.").
36
37
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Appellate Division Decision

In reversing the decision of the trial court, the appellate division
remained sensitive to the magnitude of its mission - deciding for
the first time the interplay between a written document purporting to

settle dispositional authority over cryopreserved zygotes and the legal
effect a divorce may have on the document. 4' The five-justice panel
of the appellate division unanimously agreed to overturn the trial

court's judgment, which had awarded custody of the five frozen zygotes to Mrs. Kass.4
The trial court based its decision upon the notion that a husband's procreative rights terminated immediately upon fertilization . 4 ,
The trial court ruled that the disposition of the zygotes was automatically "a matter exclusively within the wife's unfettered discretion" because a husband could not direct or control his wife's procreative
choices after fertilization." Therefore, any consent document signed
by the parties could not dispose of the issue.4 5 Each of the justices
expressed strong disagreement with the trial court's legal characterization of the IVF procedure insofar as it had assimilated the concepts
of in vivo fertilization and in vitro fertilization. 6 Implantation, which
immediately follows fertilization in the in vivo process, occurs at a
very different juncture in the in vitro fertilization procedure. Because fertilization at the ovum stage and its subsequent implantation
can be manipulated technologically and delayed in IVF, implantation
takes place at a later time, generally chosen by the woman and her
physician. The appellate division stated that it was the fact of delayed
implantation that distinguished the two procedures. 7
The five appellate courtjustices ruled unanimously that the confusion of the two distinct fertilization procedures had led to the trial
court's flawed application of the United States Supreme Court's rea41 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 585.

42 See id.
43 See id.
4 Id.
45 See id.
The term "in vitro" is defined as "[i]n glass, as in a test tube. An in vitro test is
one done in the laboratory, usually involving isolated tissue, organ, or cell preparations." TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DIcTIONARY 870 (15th ed. 1988). On the other
hand, the term "in vivo" is defined as: "In the living body or organism. A test performed on a living organism." Id. The process of in vitro fertilization thus refers to
the process of fertilization outside of the body. See supra notes 3 through 8, and accompanying text. The process of in vivo fertilization entails fertilization that takes
place in a woman's body. See Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance
Consequences of Reproductive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1091, 1106 (1997).
47 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 586; see also supra note 37 and accompanying
text.

944

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29:937

soning in Roe v. Wade.8 In that ruling, the Supreme Court held a
woman's right to bodily integrity to be protected by the Constitution. 49 As a corollary of that constitutionally protected right to privacy, a woman's right to personal autonomy and to an abortion could
not be challenged by the husband after implantation. 0 Indeed, the
appellate court stated: "Prior to implantation, that interest [a
woman's right to exercise control over her body] is not a relevant
and appropriate consideration, and a court must pursue other analytical avenues in determining whether implantation over the objection of one of the parties should be permitted or precluded."5 1 That
flawed logic led to the trial court's further mistaken legal conclusion
that the husband could never prevent implantation of the cryopreserved zygote because his participation in the IVF program indicated
that he consented to subsequent implantation.5 2
Roe teaches that the right to procreate as well as the converse
right to avoid procreation is protected by the United States Constitution. Each right is independent of the other and is conferred equally
upon females and males. As such, the appellate division ruled that
the trial court erred in equating a woman's right to attain pregnancy
via IVF with her right to bodily integrity. Moreover, the court held
that "[a] woman's established right to exercise virtually exclusive control over her own body is not implicated in the IVF scenario until
such time as implantation actually occurs, for it is only then that her
bodily integrity is at issue., 53 The issue of integrity regarding implantation of the embryo is quite distinct from the issue of an unwanted
pregnancy given that the embryo, prior to implantation is neither
physically connected to nor dependent upon the mother. Consequently, the appellate division held that, because Roe is concerned
only with the unwanted pregnancy, not the pre-implanted embryo,
Mrs. Kass
did not possess exclusive dispositional control over the zy54
gotes.

The appellate division parted ways, however, as to the ramifications of the underlying contract between the Kasses and the IVF facility. The justices unanimously agreed that, where a manifestation of
mutual intent between the parties exists, such intent must be en410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See id,
at 154.
50 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at
586.
51 Id.
52 See id. at 599 (MillerJ.,
dissenting).
48
49

53 Id. at 586.
54 See id.
at 589.
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forced by the courts. Of the five justices, only two among the majority based their decision upon the enforceability of the contractual
provisions.55 Of the three remaining, Justice Friedmann concurred,
agreeing with the majority's ruling, but not with its reasoning. 56 The
dissent intimated that, as a matter of legal principle, there is no difficulty with the use of the contract model as an appropriate vehicle for
resolving conflicts. 57 The dissent further indicated the need for the
intervention of the legislature to mandate that IVF clinics require the
execution of a standardized, binding agreement that sets forth the
parties' specific intentions in the event of a future change in circumstances. 58

The majority of the appellate division ruled for the husband and
reversed the trial court's ruling that had granted custody of the zygotes to the wife. There were, however, disparate reasons for the
same legal conclusion. The basis of the concurring justice's opinion
rested not on contract interpretation, but rather on constitutional
considerations, specifically, a party's fundamental right to avoid parenthood.
[T]here can be few situations, if any, where the burden
upon the party forced to forfeit using particular pre-zygotes
to acquire offspring will outweigh the burden upon the
party who wishes to avoid reproduction but is compelled by
court order to become a parent.
Once lost, the right not to procreate can never be regained. It is the irrevocability of parenthood that is most
60
crushing to the unconsenting gamete provider.
Because New York law had not yet evolved to allow waiver of the
biological parent's duty to support his child, Justice Friedmann maintained that only the state could legislate the dissolution of parents'
otherwise unwaivable duty to support their children. Short of such
a statutory mandate, Justice Friedmann concluded that the parties
could not, between themselves, allocate dispositional authority. It

55 See id. at 587-89.

See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 591 (Friedmann,J., concurring).

57 See id. at 594 (Miller, J., dissenting) ("Where the parties have expressed their

agreement by contract, their intentions should control ... such agreements should
be encouraged if not mandated.").
See id. at 600 (Miller J., dissenting) ("[U]litimately it is for the Legislature to
enact such progressive laws.").
59 See id. at 592 (Friedmann,J., concurring).
6, Id. The term "gamete" refers to either a male sperm or a female ovum, or
egg. See MILLER-KEANE ENCYCLOPEDIA & DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE 1085 (5th ed. 1992).
See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 593 (Friedmann,J., concurring).
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was, therefore best that the unwilling spouse be permitted to veto his
former spouse's proposed plans for implantation of the frozen zygotes to preserve an unwilling party's constitutional right not to procreate.62
The dissent and concurrence agreed that the contract between
the Kasses and the IVF program was too ambiguous to reflect the actual intent of the parties. 3 Moreover, in dissent, Justice Miller stated
unequivocally that this "legal, emotional, and ethical nightmare.., demonstrates the clear need for legislation." 61 Notably, although at first glance it appears that a majority of the appellate division found against the contract, both the dissent and concurrence
stated only that this particular contract was inadequate with regard to
the allocation of decision-making power in the event of subsequent
changed circumstances. Moreover, it is instructive that neither the
dissent nor concurrence disagreed with employing the contractual
model as a framework for determining the status and dispositional
authority of the cryopreserved zygotes. In fact, the dissent called for
"legislation mandating that [IVF] clinics require the execution of a
standardized, binding agreement setting forth the parties' specific in,, 65
tentions in the event of foreseeable changes in circumstances ....
The dissent agreed with the plurality opinion which, after interpreting the contractual provisions, had determined that the ambiguity of the contract was self-created.6 6 The language of the contract did
not evidence the intention of the divorced litigants. According to
Justice Friedmann, the position of the dispositional clause at the end
of the informed consent document suggested that it became operative only after the couple's association with the program had ended,
either because the wife bore a child or because the couple decided to
discontinue their participation in the program. 6 The sentence,
which enumerates divorce as a contingency, triggers determination
62

See id.

63

See id.at 591 (Friedmann,J., concurring) ("I do not believe that the informed

consent document relied on here provides real insight into the intentions of these
divorced parties."). The dissent agreed, stating that "in the case before us, although
the parties did enter into an 'informed consent' document, it failed to provide an
unambiguous statement of their intent." Id. at 594 (MillerJ, dissenting).
6 Id.

Id. at 591.
See id. at 594 (Miller, J., dissenting) (stating that the document was clearly
ambiguous).
See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 591 (Friedmann, J., concurring) (referring to the
portion of the contract with the IVF facility that provided for disposition of the frozen zygotes "in the event that [the Kasses] no longer wish [ed] to initiate a pregnancy
or [were] unable to reach a decision" with regard to the stored zygotes).
6
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of the zygotes' legal status as part of a property settlement determined by a court. The concurring justice could not agree that the
contract was dispositive of decisional control over the zygotes."'
The majority, however, viewed the provision that enumerated
death and incapacity as examples of "unforeseen circumstances," as
illustrative rather than exhaustive. The majority conceded that even
where one portion of the informed consent language might be ambiguous, such "ambiguity may be resolved by reading that document
as a whole to determine its purpose and intent."
The majority further insisted upon gleaning the parties' intentions from the document's language as a whole and particularly from
its liberal use of the words "we," "us," and "our," wherein the litigants
acknowledge their joint right to abide by a single decision as to the
disposition of the zygotes7 0 To buttress their argument, the majority
pointed to the uncontested divorce document, which not only referenced the IVF program contract but incorporated the 1VF contractual provision for dispositional authority over the zygotes.7 ' According to the court, the parties' intentions can be inferred not only from
the document in its entirety, but from all factual circumstances as
well. Indeed, repeated statements of the parties' intent "merit serious consideration and are entitled to great deference.""
B.

Court ofAppeals Decision

Chief Judge Kaye initiated analysis of the issue of dispositional
authority by recognizing that "[a]s science races ahead, it leaves in its
trail mind-numbing ethical and legal questions ....The law, whether
statutory' or decisional, has been evolving more slowly and cautiously." "1
Given the paucity of legal precedent in the state, the court was
cognizant of its unique duty to fashion clear and uniform principles.
8

69
70

See id.
See id. at 589.
See id.at 587. Specifically, the plurality stated:
[I]t is clear from the tenor of its language as well as from its liberal use
of the words 'we', 'us' and 'our' that the parties' very participation in
the IVF program is premised on their status as a married couple committed to a single joint decision to use IVF in an attempt to achieve
parenthood.

Id.

See id. at 589 ("While the uncontested divorce instrument never became operative, it constitutes compelling evidence that the parties ... intended to authorize
the use of the pre-zygotes by the IVF program .
).
71

7

Id.

73

Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 178 (N.Y. 1998).
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The court stated that " [w] hat is plain, however, is the need for clear,
consistent principles to guide parties in protecting their interests and
resolving their disputes, and the need for particular care in fashion74
ing such principles as issues are better defined and appreciated.
Against this backdrop, ChiefJudge Kaye examined three models
developed by legal scholars75 and case law emanating from a sister
state. The court accepted the Tennessee Supreme Court's opinion in
Davis v. Davis for the proposition that "[a]greements between progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes
should generally be presumed valid and binding, and enforced in
any dispute between them.""
This statement becomes all the more instructive because it embodies the direction in which the New York Court of Appeals wished
to take the law. In fact, before Kass, there had been no statement
from any court in any jurisdiction that embraced the contractual
model for resolving the debate over dispositional authority. Certainly, the Davis court cannot be held to have articulated that legal
position as part of its analysis. In Kass, the New York Court of Appeals, framing the issue of dispositional authority solely in terms of
contract enforceability, stated the underlying policy considerations:
Indeed, parties should be encouraged in advance, before embarking on IVF and cryopreservation, to think through possible contingencies and carefully specify their wishes in writing. Explicit
agreements avoid costly litigation in business transactions. They
are all the more necessary and desirable in personal matters of
reproductive choice, where the intangible costs of any litigation
are simply incalculable.78
Lest the Kass decision be critiqued for its economical approach,
the court of appeals suggested that it is only through the enforceabil74

Id. at 179.

ChiefJudge Kaye quoted the scholarly literature because "[a] Ithough statutory
and decisional law are sparse, abundant commentary offers a window on the issues."
Id. at 179. The chief judge cited three approaches from those commentaries: (1)
control to the gamete provider, (2) implied contract theory, and (3) the "bundle of
rights" theory. Id. The fourth approach is an express contract theory which Chief
Judge Kaye adopts as precedent in this case. See id. at 180. The framework for that
analysis has been alluded to in the Davis decision and in the academic literature.
842 S.W.2d 558 (Tenn. 1992).
77 Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180. It should be noted
that, although the Davis court articulated this legal postulate and is cited for that principle, such a statement of law
constitutes dicta because no written contract was ever executed between the Davises
and their IVF program. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592 ("There was no discussion, let
alone an agreement, concerning disposition in the event of a contingency such as
divorce.").
78 Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180.
75
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ity. of contract approach that the constitutionally protected goal of
procreational liberty will be reserved exclusively for the people."9
The court cited articles by Professor John Robertson, 0 who has
argued consistently that the parties - the biological donors through the formation of a contract, enforceable at law, are best positioned to exercise control over procreative choice."' Professor
Robertson, one of the most influential commentators in this area, has
addressed the issue of who is better suited to control reproduction,
the state or the parties themselves. 2 Professor Robertson advocates
that the parties' mutual agreement, as evidenced by contract, is the
most efficient model for enforcing reproductive liberty, and aggregating personal life choices to those with most at stake.82 Our legal
tradition defers to the parties' voluntary actions rather than accept
the state's imposition of normative rulings and statements of principles, unless a compelling state interest is present.
The court of appeals accepted Professor Robertson's assertion
that it is the progenitor or the biological donor, and not the state,
who ought to be the repository of dispositional authority over the
embryo. The court stated, "To the extent possible, it should be the
progenitors -

not the State and not the courts -

who by their prior

84
directive make this deeply personal life choice.
Although the court recognized the primacy of procreative liberty and the biological donor's free choice in this matter, it was not
ignorant of the difficulty of enforcing the parties' advance directives
as expressed in their contract. This process is problematic in two important ways. First, it must be determined whether an agreement be-

See id. ("Advance directives, subject to mutual change of mind that must
be
jointly expressed, both minimize misunderstandings and maximize procreative liberty by reserving to the progenitors the authority to make what is in the first instance
a quintessentially personal, private decision.").
Professor, University of Texas at Austin, School of Law. For a list of Professor
Robertson's articles, see supra note 2.
See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (citing Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 2;
Robertson, In the Beginning, supra note 2).
82 For an in-depth discussion of the interplay between IVF technology,
the right
to procreate, and legal protection of the rights to privacy and procreation, see Robertson, DecisionalAuthority, supra note 2, and Robertson, Embryos, Families, supra note
2. For a discussion of enforcement of disposition agreements, see Robertson, In the
Beginning, supranote 2.
82 Professor Robertson's articles argue in favor of the contract
model as a framework for resolving control disputes over extra-corporeal eggs. SeeJohn A. Robertson,
Resolving Disputes Over Frozen Embryos, HASTINGS GrR. REP., Nov./Dec. 1989, at 7
[hereinafter Robertson, Resolving Disutes], and Robertson, In the Beginning, supra
note 2.
,84 Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180.
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tween the couple and the IVF facility ought to govern the personal
relationship of the couple. 5 Can and should a contract with a thirdparty facility be viewed as an expression of guidance for that relationship? Second, will this contract between the couple and the IVF program be honored in situations where one member of the couple argues a change in circumstances, such as death or divorce? 86
ChiefJudge Kaye's opinion responded in the affirmative to each
question.87 The Kass decision constitutes a seminal ruling as to the
first issue. Specifically, the New York Court of Appeals found that the
parties addressed this matter and, whether this intent is expressed in
an agreement with a third party or in an agreement among the couple themselves, that intent has found a clear expression. Indeed, the
court focused its reasoning on the parties' intent itself as opposed to
the instrument within which that intent found expression .8
The court noted that all agreements that look to a future time
deal with the unknown and create difficulty, thus underscoring the
need for certainty. ChiefJudge Kaye stated that "advance agreements
as to disposition would have little purpose if they were enforceable
only in the event the parties continued to agree." 9 In fact, it is precisely because future events are fraught with uncertainty that parties
must be encouraged to be cautious in their deliberations. Although
not all contingencies can be anticipated, there is no reason to throw
out the concept of the advance directive. Along these lines, the court
stated that the parties' knowledge of the enforceability of the contract will have achieved the very purpose of emphasizing the seriousness and integrity of the consent process.90 Knowing that an advance
directive will not be easily undone ultimately discourages frivolous
decision-making.

See id.
See id.
87 See
id
s See id. at 181. The court stated:
The conclusion that emerges most strikingly from reviewing these con85

86

sents as a whole is that appellant and respondent intended that dispo-

sition of the pre-zygotes was to be their joint decision. The consents
manifest that what they above all did not want was a stranger taking

that decision out of their hands.
Id.
Id&at 180.
See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 ("Knowing that advance agreements will be enforced underscores the seriousness and integrity of the consent process ...").
90
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DA VIS V. DAVIS

Despite the Kass court's reference to the Davis decision, 9' the
reasoning in Davis does not apply to the Kasses for two reasons. First,
the Davis court did not address the contract model because the parties had not executed a contract. 2 Second, Mrs. Davis petitioned the
court to permit donation of the frozen zygotes to a childless couple,
whereas Mrs. Kass sought custody of the frozen fertilized ova for selfimplantation.93 Mrs. Kass, unlike Mrs. Davis, feared that she would
lose her best chance for genetic motherhood unless she were granted
sole custody.9 4 The Davises, like the Kasses, turned to an IVF program following unsuccessful attempts to achieve parenthood through
coital reproduction. 5 Moreover, both couples decided to dissolve
their marriages subsequent to unsuccessful efforts at in vitro fertilization.96

One major difference, however, is that the Kasses signed an uncontested divorce document that included reference to their signed
written contract with the IVF program. That contract detailed their
informed consent to commit jointly to a single decision regarding
custody and disposition of the cryopreserved zygotes.
Both the Davises and the Kasses had resolved their respective
matrimonial actions with the exception of the issue of custody of the
embryos, which was left for judicial resolution. In Davis, by the time
of the hearing before the state supreme court, each party had remarried and neither wanted a child with the other as a parent.'17 The
Davises had, prior to their respective remarriages, changed their
minds several times with regard to custody of the zygotes. 8 At the
time of their hearing before the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Mrs.
Davis wished to donate the embryos to a childless couple, while her
ex-husband wanted them to be discarded.9i Mr. Davis sought to block
any implantation on the grounds that such a procedure would produce an unwanted fatherhood, thus violating his constitutionally protected right to avoid fatherhood.'
See id. at 180 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992)).
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1992).
93 See id.; Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
94 See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 593 (Friedmann,J. concurring).
95 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
91
92

"

See id.
97 See id.

See id. at 590 ("We note ... that their positions have already shifted.").
W See id.
100 See Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13,
1990).
98
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At trial, while Mrs. Davis wished to use the fertilized ova for selfimplantation, the court awarded her sole custody and unilateral control over their implantation.'0 ' Characterizing the frozen embryo as a
"person" and, following the analysis of Roe v. Wade,102 the trial judge
held that as a corollary of her right to bodily integrity, the female had
unique decisional authority.' 3
On appeal, the judges reversed the trial court and awarded joint
custody of the embryos to the parties, "with equal voice over their
disposition," insofar as they shared an interest in the fertilized ova.' °4
The court of appeals found that the legal status to be accorded to the
embryos necessitated "more respect than mere human cells because
of their burgeoning potential for life. But, even after viability, they
are not given legal status equivalent to that of a person already
born. '" 5 Certainly, prior to implantation, the legal status of the embryo is of a lower grade than that of the implanted embryo. Accordingly, the court asserted that there could be "no compelling state interest" to justify an order of "implantation against the will of either
party."' 6 The appellate court based its decision on its perception of
the trial court's holding as a flawed understanding of the Constitution. The ex-husband's unwillingness to become a parent was consti07
tutionally protected because a pregnancy had not yet begun.
Judge Franks, speaking for the court in Davis, recognized a citizen's right to procreate as a "basic civil right" that cannot be violated
by the state.'O" To award custody of the frozen eggs to the female
"constitutes impermissible state action" and violates the male's
constitutionally protected right not to beget a child where no pregnancy has taken place."'' After reviewing the legal status of the fetus
in Tennessee, the court concluded that the there was "no compelling
state interest" to justify an order of implantation against the will of
either party."
In a footnote, the court warned of the potential
nightmare stemming from state control over reproduction, describing a sinister policy in Nazi Germany that forced people who alleg101 See id. at * 1.
102 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
103 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595.
104 Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *3.
105

Id. at *2.

106

Id.

107

See id.

See id. ("The decision whether to bear or beget a child is a constitutionally
protected choice.").
108

109 Id.

11 See Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2.

1999]

FROZEN EMBRYOS

953

edly possessed hereditary diseases to prove to a court why they should
not be sterilized."'
In sum, the court reasoned that a "potential for life" is not the
legal equivalent of a "person" and, as a result, the trial court's legal
scheme must fail. The trial judge was criticized for
his fact finding and legal conclusions [which] ignored the public
policy implicit in the Tennessee statutes, the case holdings of the
Tennessee Supreme Court and the teachings of the United States
Supreme Court. We are required to resolve the issue consistent
with the2 existing Tennessee law and the parties' constitutional
rights.11

As such, the court awarded the parties joint custody and control of
the frozen embryos. The court explained that to uphold the lower
court's ruling would be "repugnant and offensive to constitutional
principles."' "
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, the court questioned whether safeguarding of a litigant's constitutional rights
should automatically lead to an order of joint custody with equal
voice." 4 The court of appeals decision guaranteed a stalemate whenever the in vitro couple disagreed, thus making it virtually impossible
for the embryo ever to be implanted. The state supreme court
sought to assess whether or not the inevitable result of an automatic
veto was the most judicious way to handle this thorny issue of control." 5 The court affirmed the earlier court of appeals decision, but
See id. n.7. The court stated:
A haunting reminder of the evils of uncontrolled state action is found
in Schuman's contemporary account of the state's control of reproduction in Nazi Germany: Under the sterilization law a series of
'Hereditary Health Courts' were established throughout the Reich
with appellate courts and a Supreme Hereditary Health Court with
power to deliver final judgments. Before these bodies all persons suspected of hereditary disease are obliged to appear and show cause why
they should not be rendered sterile through a surgical operation.
Id.

Id. at *3.
Id.
114 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992). Although
the court of
appeals granted to the Davises "joint control" of the embryos and "equal voice" over
their disposition, the practical consequences of this ruling is to grant to the unwilling partner more than an "equal voice". In effect, the party who opposes implantation is granted veto power since the unwilling partner must consent to any implantation. The likelihood of obtaining such consent is remote, if not impossible. Thus,
what on paper seems like an equitable solution can become, in practical terms, the
granting of exclusive rights of control to one party. See Feliciano, supra note 2,at
340.
115 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604; see also Feliciano, supra note 2, at 341-42 ("Davis is
112

113

954

SETON HALL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 29:937

modified that ruling, stating that the "[c]ourt of [a]ppeals, at least by6
implication, may have swung too far in the opposite direction."01
The court, however, emphasized that review of the previous appellate
decision was necessary because of "the obvious importance of the
case in terms of the development of law regarding new reproductive
technologies," and the need for "adequate
guidance," which the in11 7
termediate court had not provided.
The court abandoned the "person" versus "property" dichotomy
utilized by both the trial court and the court of appeals. To conclude
that the embryo was a person ran counter to the prevailing view
1 8 Similarly, to
gleaned from state statutes and judicial precedent.
rule that the zygote was property would grant automatic veto power
to any party opposing implantation.""9 Mechanically granting such
authority would lead to inequitable results without any investigation
into the "bundle of rights" possessed by each gamete provider. 20 Accordingly, the court incorporated the ethical standards set by the
American Fertility Society, and concluded that the embryo was neither a person nor property. 2 1 Instead, the embryos "occupy an in-

not meant to be understood as vesting automatic veto power in the party who does
not want to utilize the embryos.").
116 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595.
17Id.at 590 ("[T]he decision of the Court of Appeals does not give adequate
guidance to the trial court ... .
118 See id at 596.
19 See ii at 598 (stating that the effect of the
appellate court's ruling would grant
the father "inherent power to veto any transfer of the preembryos in this case..
120

See id.

121

See id. at 596-97.

The court found that "the most helpful discussion on this

point is found not in the minuscule number of legal opinions that have involved
'frozen embryos,' but in the ethical standards set by The American Fertility Society ...." Id. at 596.
The court noted the three major ethical positions cited by The American Fertility Society (Society) as to the status of the frozen embryo:
1) As a human subject, which bars any action that might harm the
embryo;
2) As no different from any other human tissue, and therefore places
no restrictions on the actions taken with the embryo;
3) The middle position which finds that although the embryo does
not deserve the respect accorded to human persons, it does deserve
greater respect than that given to ordinary tissue.
Id. at 596.
In consequence, the Society recommends that decision-making authority be
granted to the gamete providers as they donated the genetic material and because
the fundamental right to procreate is involved. See id. at 597. The Society makes
these recommendations in those instances where there is no specific legislation on
the subject. See id at 597.
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terim category that entitles them to special respect because of their
potential for human life. '2
Both federal and state law precluded judicial recognition of the
preembryo's legal status as a person and, therefore, the investiture of
"legally cognizable interests" independent of their progenitors. The
court concluded that to hold otherwise would effectively outlaw IVF
programs in Tennessee, contrary to legislative intent. 23 It did not follow, however, that just because the gamete providers do not have a
true property interest, they do not possess an ownership interest in
the zygotes.' 24 Specifically, the court held that "[parents] do have an
interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent that they have decision-making authority concerning disposition of the preembryos,
within the scope of policy set by law."'02 5 The court stated that decisional authority must reside in the progenitors alone since no one26
else bears the consequences of these decisions to the same extent.1
Given the policy decision that such decisional authority is reserved
exclusively to the gamete providers, the supreme court found that, as
a starting point, any agreement regarding disposition of any untransferred embryos "should be2 7presumed valid and should be enforced as
between the progenitors.'
The Davis decision could not be based on the contract model
because there was no formal agreement between the Davises and the
IVF facility, either at the time of the infertility procedures or at any
later date. But, the Davis court opined that the contract model was
the preferred method of conflict resolution:
[W] e hold that disputes involving the disposition of preembryos
produced by [IVF] should be resolved, first, by looking to the
preferences of the progenitors. If their wishes cannot be ascertained, or if there is a dispute, then their prior agreement concerning disposition should be carried out. If no prior agreement
exists, then the relative interests of the2 parties in using or not using the preembryos must be weighed. 8
Absent an enforceable contract, Judge Daughtrey stated that a
court must balance the relative benefits derived versus the burdens
imposed through the exercise or the prevention of procreative

1
12'

Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.

See id.at 595.
id at 597 ("[Parents] do have an interest in the nature of ownership ... .

124 See
125
1

127
128

Id

See id.(stating that progenitors should retain decision-making authority).
Id. at 597.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
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rights.' 2 Without using the term "presumption," which implies a definitive legal construct, the court suggested that, as a default rule, the
scale should be tipped in favor of the party wishing to avoid procreation.1 30 This rule allows that party to prevail unless the other side had
no reasonable possibility of achieving genetic or biologic parenthood
by any other means.'. Therefore, one party's preference for using
frozen embryos for the sake of mere convenience or cost efficiency
132
would not be an adequate basis for granting custody to implant.
Accordingly, the court in Davis found that the husband had a greater
interest in avoiding procreation than his
ex-wife, who sought to do133
couple.
childless
a
to
embryos
the
nate
The court left open the possibility of a different result in cases
where a woman sought self-implantation and could adduce evidence4
that this represented her last opportunity for genetic motherhood.
This was precisely the argument that Mrs. Kass asserted to the New
York courts. She asserted greater rights to the frozen embryos insofar as they represented her final chance for pregnancy and motherhood. 35 The Kass court did not address this issue because it decided
that the contract and its provisions were dispositive of the legal issues
in the case. 136 The concurrence and dissent in Kass, however, opined
that Mrs. Kass had not presented sufficient evidence to prove her
case."' Among the factors she could have asserted to prove her case
1
See id. at 603. Judge Daughtrey held that the balancing of the relative interests
of each party is "a task familiar to the courts," precisely because judges have always
wrestled with conflicting interests of constitutional import. See id.
130 See id. at 604 (stating that "Mary Sue Davis's interest in donation
is not as significant as the interestJunior Davis has in avoiding parenthood").
131 See id. (noting that this case might have been different if Mary Sue Davis
could
not achieve motherhood "by any other reasonable means").
12 See id. Among the criteria to be considered in this
test are: "[T] he positions
of the parties, the significance of their interests, and the relative burdens that will be
imposed by differing resolutions." Id. at 603.
P. See id. at
604.
134 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d. Judge Daughtrey did not actually state
that the frozen
embryos must represent the last opportunity for genetic/gestational motherhood.
Yet, in giving examples of what amounted to an inability to "achieve parenthood by
any other reasonable means," including additional IVF attempts or adoption, Judge
Daughtrey implies that the frozen eggs must represent the final chance for such genetic/gestational parenthood. See id.
135 See Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (Miller, J., dissent-

See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998)
("Because [the issue] is answered in this case by the parties' agreement ... we have no cause to decide whether
the pre-zygotes are entitled to 'special respect."').
See Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d at 593 (Friedmann, J., concurring). Because Mrs. Kass
merely contended that she had a medical condition that inhibited her ability to con-
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would be evidence of financial ability, emotional investment, and
motivations for wishing parenthood.'
The decision in Davis, alongside its presumption that written,
executed instruments should govern parties' actions, allowed for the
distinct eventuality that a contract might not anticipate all events,
emotional and psychological, that may transpire as the IVF process
unfolds.3 9 Because the court did not need to interpret a contract,
however, it was unnecessary
to decide further how such a dispute
40
resolved.1
be
could
How should a court adjudicate a contract that may not be the result of arm's length negotiations? Would that be deemed a contract
of adhesion? Additionally, could the passage of time or the occurrence of unanticipated events frustrate a contract's purpose or make
its performance impossible? Unfortunately, the Davis court failed to
discuss such issues.
The New York Court of Appeals in Kass held that for a contract
to be enforceable, it must be proven to have been freely consented to
and knowingly made.4 Indeed, the Kasses never indicated that the
contract was made either involuntarily or unknowingly. Instead, the
Kasses argued that the voluntariness of the agreement with the IVF
facility was irrelevant because the contract did not govern an allocation of decision-making power between themselves as individuals, but
rather was only an agreement between themselves as a couple and
the IVF program. 4 2 The court specifically addressed that issue and it
is precisely that reasoning that constitutes the seminal precedent for
future litigation. The court stated that the couple's intention, as garnered from an agreement between them as a single entity and the
ceive, the concurrence found that she failed to satisfy her threshold burden. See id,
at 593-94 ("[T] he plaintiff has effectively proven on the instant record that she could
not make the necessary showing of exigency even if she were afforded the opportunity ... her submissions to date have been unconvincing."). The dissent argued that
Mrs. Kass's arguments were insufficient because she assumed that she "should prevail as a matter of law without a factual inquiry." Id. at 601 (Miller, J., dissenting).
138 See
id.
139 See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597 ("It follows that the parties'
initial 'informed consent' to IVF procedures [would] often not be truly informed because of the near
impossibility of anticipating, emotionally and psychologically, all the turns that
events may take as the IVF process unfolds.").
140 See id. The court does, however, suggest that modification
of the initial agreement be allowed with the proviso that the modification be reached through a process of mutual agreement. See id
,41 See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 ("Nor do the parties contest the legality of those
agreements or that they were freely and knowingly made.").
This argument could be made precisely because contracts were provided by
the VF program.
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IVF program, must be taken as evidence of intent among the partners themselves.14 No separate instrument or agreement was necessary to determine the couple's intentions inasmuch as that intention
could be inferred from the executed instrument with the IVF facility.144 The Davis court, on the other hand, did not address this issue

given that the parties had not entered into an agreement.
The decision in Kass resolved two critical independent legal issues. First, New York would follow the contract model for resolution
of decision-making authority with regard to frozen embryos.1 45 Second, New York would not require evidence of a separate agreement
between the couple because their intentions would be deduced from
their written, executed agreement with the IVF program.1
The Kass court, following the model of contract and the rules of
contract interpretation, did allow for modification of contract provisions.147 As with any contract, however, such modification becomes
enforceable only where each party to that agreement freely consents
to any subsequent modification. The court did not discuss whether a
contract model in this area contravened public policy considerations
because there was no need for its discussion.1 48 Instead, the court
stated merely that all agreements remain subject to public policy considerations. 4 " No discussion of what constitutes public policy ensued
because neither party had raised the issue and the court chose not to
initiate such a discussion. 5 °
46

143

See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 ("While these documents were technically provided

by the IVF program, neither party disputes that they are an expression of their own
intent regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes... The central issue is whether the
consents clearly express the parties' intent regarding disposition of the pre-zygotes
in the present circumstances.").
'44
See id.
145 See id. ("Agreements between progenitors,
or gamete donors, regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed valid and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them.").
146

See id.

See id. ("Advance directives, subject to mutual change of mind that must be
jointly expressed, both minimize misunderstandings and maximize procreative libert...").
In a footnote, Chief Judge Kaye states that Mrs. Kass did not argue that the
consents ran counter to public policy or that they become legally unenforceable because of a significant change in circumstances. See id. n.4.
149 See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at
180.
150 See id. at 182 n.5.
Chief Judge Kaye disagreed with the appellate division on
this point, noting that
unless public policy is violated, parties to a litigation are free to chart
their own procedural course - as they did here. On January 9, 1995,
both sides agreed that the matter should be determined on the submissions ...."The record upon which we must rule was thereby estab147
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III. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The courts in Kass and Davis were each mindful of their significant role in a new and technologically burgeoning area.' 51 Chief
Judge Kaye stated, "Although statutory and decisional law are sparse,
abundant commentary offers a window on the issues ahead, particularly suggesting various approaches to the issue of disposition of prezygotes. ' 0 5 The court did not defer to the legislature but instead
viewed the judiciary as the most appropriate forum to determine the
proper framework within which the question of dispositional
control
53
of frozen zygotes or embryos should be resolved.
Without direction from either the legislature or the judiciary in
earlier New York case law, the Kass court carefully examined the significant academic scholarship on the subject. Four distinct approaches to the issue of dispositional control emerge from this analysis.
A.

Sole Authority in Gamete Provider(s)

The first approach is to empower the gamete provider(s) and to
vest dispositional authority in him (them) exclusively as a corollary of
that control.154 By awarding sole authority to the biological provider(s), this model simultaneously removes any and all authority
from any other body or institution. Such a grant of decision-making
lished."
Id. (quoting Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 590 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
See id. at 178. ChiefJudge Kaye stated that in the last twenty years "thousands
of children have been born through IVF" and "tens of thousands of frozen embryos"
are in storage, but "[t]he law, whether statutory or decisional has been evolving
more slowly and cautiously." Id. In Davis, on the other hand, Judge Daughtrey,
speaking for the Supreme Court of Tennessee, stated: "[E]ven with no statutory
authority or common law precedents to guide us, we do have the benefit of extensive comment and analysis in the legal journals." Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590
(Tenn. 1992).
152 Kass, 696 N.E.2d
at 179.
153 See id. at 180. ChiefJudge Kaye viewed the role of the
judiciary as the enforcer
of the parties' expression of choice, stating that "[t]o the extent possible it should be
the progenitors - not the state and not the courts - who by their prior directive
make this deeply personal life choice." Id.
154See, e.g., Poole, supra note 2, at 81 ("[E]ach donor must be able to veto
the implantation of any embryo ....). The legal commentators who would grant exclusive control to one of the two biological providers include Poole, who states that the
female gamete provider is equal to the male gamete provider and, as such, has an
equal right of control. See id.Consequently, either gamete provider should, as a default rule, be allowed to veto implantation containing his genetic material. See id.
Andrews, on the other hand, would grant control to the female gamete provider. See
Andrews, supra note 2, at 407 ("[T]he woman's wishes should govern because of a
presumption that it is better to have an embryo gestated by its biological parent .. ").
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power evinces a belief that only those who provide genetic material
have the right to fix the disposition of their body products. Neither
the legislature nor the judiciary, as an institution, is possessed of this
right.
This model, however, does not assure that control is always exercised by the same progenitor.5 5 Scholars have disagreed as to
which of the two putative parents should be granted the greater control. For example, Elisa Poole states that because the contract model
is merely a partial solution, the parties will often not be able to anticipate unforeseen circumstances. 56 As such, she argues that the
ideal model invests both gamete providers with equal rights to terminate the procreative process."' Her position is predicated on the assumption that a unique opportunity is afforded to the couple undergoing IVF treatment, precisely because the sequencing of physical
stages can be technologically manipulated.5 8 Implantation, generally
a stage immediately following fertilization, can in fact be delayed.
Therefore, Poole argues, there is no bodily integrity issue during this
time interval between the fertilization and the implantation stages.159
In the IVF context, either the male or the female is allowed to make a
decision whether or not to procreate, which in a natural setting is
limited to the female. Therefore, to preserve equality in decisionmaking rights, veto power should be granted to either gamete provider who is unwilling to proceed with the IVF process.160
The rationale behind this theory of dispositional rights is that
only an automatic veto affords to the individual the assurance of
avoiding unwanted parenthood, because both donors have the same
constitutional right to make procreative decisions.
Poole claims
But see Poole, supra note 2, at 81 ("[B]oth donors have the same constitutional
right to make procreative decisions"). See generally Andrews, supra note 2.
See Poole, supra note 2, at 91 ("[T]here will always be situations in which the
parties did not contract and for which such a default rule is needed.").
157 See id. at 81 (stating that although a woman
has invested more in creating the
embryos, she should not have a greater right in determining the fate of those embryos).
b8)See id. at 84 ("[IVF] involves more levels of decision making than does a nor155

malpregnancy.").

See id. Specifically, Poole states that "[t]he window of opportunity that occurs
after fertilization and before implantation in IVF allows both men and women to exercise the fundamental right to exercise procreative choice that is limited to women
in the natural context." Id.
160 See id. at 90 ("Both donors should have the same
basic rights to make procreative decisions.").
161 See id.at 81 ("[E]ach donor must
be able to veto the implantation of any embryo... This right to veto is needed in order for the individual to avoid the burdens

of unwanted parenthood.").
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that the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade6 2 focused on the burdens of
pregnancy and parenthood and granted equal decision-making rights
to both the female and the male.16 3 However, Roe cannot then be interpreted to mean that a person's right to control his genetic material and reproductive capacity is subsumed within the right to procreate. To this end, Poole suggests that the "Supreme Court should
extend the fundamental procreative right to include control over
one's genetic material. The right claimed is not just the right to be
free from psychological burdens of unwanted parenthood. It is also
the right to control one's genetic material and reproductive capac,,
ity. 164

Lori Andrews'6 5 reaches a different conclusion, although based
upon the same assumption that it is the gamete provider, and not the
state, who is best equipped to make decisions about the genetic material he provides.' 66 Not only is the progenitor most suited to make
such fundamental, personal decisions, but the right to make these
decisions stems from the constitutional rights to privacy and personal
autonomy. 66 Andrews, however, concludes that greater rights should
be given to women. 68 Analogizing this situation to the legal principle
that a woman may abort a fetus without her husband's consent, Andrews states that the same reasoning may therefore apply to a far earlier stage in the procreative process. Furthermore, she argues that
the woman's wishes should govern because "it is better to have an
embryo gestated by its biological parent. " ""'
This reasoning is questionable. If, for example, Roe stands for
the proposition that a woman has a right not to procreate, one might
wonder whether Andrews is not taking an unduly narrow interpretation of that decision. Roe certainly permitted the woman to control
162
163

164
1
6

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Poole, supra note 2, at 82.

Id.
Attorney and Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation.
See Andrews, supra note 2, at 358-59 ("Throughout this century, the Supreme

Court has emphasized the protected nature of private family decisions . .

.

. Procrea-

tion and child rearing are necessary conditions for individual and social wellbeing.)
SgSee
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) ("[T]he Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the state.").
168SeeAndrews, supra note 2, at 406 ("The woman has been held to have a right
to abort without the husband's consent and the right not to abort over the wish of
the husband that she abort.").
1
Id. at 407. Andrews claims that this is so because a man is incapable of gestating an embryo. See id.
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the procreative process by allowing her to have an abortion subject to
some limitations.' 70 But most importantly, Roe holds that the State
has no compelling interest in this process prior to the viability of the
fetus. 17 At that point, the fetus could sustain life outside the mother
and therefore have an independent status from its mother. Roe did
not purport to vest greater or lesser rights in either of the putative
biological parents. In fact, Roe and its progeny are cited for the principle that the right to procreate and the right not to procreate are
independent rights, each equally protected for either gender.'7 Roe,
therefore, need not be extended to apply to all procreative mechanisms because there is no pregnancy until implantation has taken
place. 75
Still another approach might favor the woman. That argument,
also known as the sweat equity factor, ' 74 rests on the assumption that
procreative rights, by their very biological nature, cannot be equal
for both genders. In the IVF process, the female undergoes a physically and emotionally trying, not to mention invasive, procedure. On
the other hand, the male's biological contribution is a far simpler
one. In giving weight to the sweat equity theory, the tendency is to
favor the female progenitor, precisely because she has endured more
hardship.17 5 This "sweat equity," it is suggested, should grant her superior decision-making rights. 176

170 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("[T]he right [to have an abortion]

is not absolute and is subject to some limitations ... ").
171 See Carey, 431 U.S. at 686 ("'Compelling' is of course the key word; where a
decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only by compelling state interests, and
must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests.").
17 See e.g., Andrews, supra note 2, at 75 ("The Supreme Court's rhetoric
can be
interpreted to cover all procreative decisions.").
See id. (noting that pre-implantation embryos cannot be viewed as viable).
174 See Robertson, Resolving Disputes, supra note 83, at 7. This theory recognizes
the differences in physical hardship endured respectively by the male and the female. The female does most of the sweating and should therefore have greater decision making rights. See id. Professor Robertson argues against this rule, stating that
"the difference in bodily burdens between the man and the woman in IVF is not so
great ... that it should automatically determine decisional authority over resulting
embryos." Id.; see also Poole, supra note 2, at 89 (discussing the "sweat equity" rule
and Professor Robertson's assertions). But see Feliciano, supra note 2, at 347 ("Such
dismissal of the sweat equity argument grossly underestimates the physical strain on
a female IVF participant.").
175 See Robertson, ResolvingDisputes, supranote
83, at 7.
176 See Poole, supra note 2, at 88 ("Donors invest time, money, and
gametes in the
IVF process, but only the woman incurs physical risk.").
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B. Implied Contract
The second model for resolving disputes over dispositional7
authority adopts the implied contract as its necessary framework.1
An implied contract infers an agreement or a contract based upon
the dealings of the parties. ' 78 An agreement is created whether or not
the parties signed a formal document. 7 " Each party exchanges mutual promises to complete the 1VF procedure and to contribute the
genetic material to effectuate the process leading up to the cryopreservation of the fertilized ova.1 80 This argument, therefore, is
based on the notion that a contract exists between the parties because each of the gamete providers agreed to the IVF procedure with
the facility.'8

Furthermore, because each party is aware of the other's reliance
on this contract, the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be invoked
to prevent the unwilling party from terminating the other's right to
procreate.'
The donation of gametes by each party is viewed as a
commitment to reproduce using them. To allow the unwilling gamete provider to railroad the other side's wishes would be a destruction of a condition in that implied agreement. Moreover, by enrolling as infertility patients with an IVF program, one partner
demonstrates that he relied, to his detriment, on the other party's
participation. The unwilling partner should, therefore, be estopped
from opposing subsequent implantation.
On the other hand, not all who would view this process as an ex83
ample of the implied contract would apply promissory estoppel.
Among the complications anticipated by one proponent of the implied contract framework is the issue of whether the continuation of

177 See Trespalacios, supra note 2, at 828 (describing the use
of an implied contract approach to the storage of pre-embryos); Feliciano, supra note 2, at 345
("[L]ooking to an implied contract between the parties may provide an equitable
solution ....); see also Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992) (noting the
possibility of an implied contract in such situations).
178 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1-12
(1987) ("When [an agree-

ment] is manifested by conduct, it is said to be implied in fact .... The distinction

between this kind of contract and a contract expressed in words is unimportant:.
both are true contracts formed by a mutual manifestation of assent.").
17
See Feliciano, supra note 2, at 346 ("[Plarticipation in an IVF program reasonably leads to the assumption that both parties have committed to reproduction.").
:80 See Trespalacios, supra note 2, at 829.
181

See Feliciano, supra note 2, at 346.

id. at 346-47.
See Trespalacios, supra note 2, at 829-31.

182 See
183
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the marriage is-a prerequisite to enforcement of the contract. 1 4 If

yes, then further questions arise with regard to a change in circumstances. For example, would divorce frustrate the implied contract
and be grounds for a discharge of contract?' 8 5 A proponent of the

implied contract theory asserts that the "sole purpose of creating preembryos [is] to facilitate their growth and development into children. If there [is] no evidence that the parties discussed other possibilities, then the agreement [does] not encompass such possibilities. ' 8 6
C. Express Contract
A third approach would require the execution of a formal contract that details the parties' wishes specifically, and indicates the
mechanism to be followed where future unforeseen events upset the
dispositional scheme as set by contract."7 Another approach would
not only advocate the enforceability of a written contract, but would
also require the legislature to enact statutory provisions mandating
the requirement of such a contract in any dealings between the infer88
tile couple and the IVF facility."
The advantages of such a model lie in its clear evidence of intent.189 The written document provides protection against the erosion
of memories at precisely that moment in time when such dimming of
these recollections is least desirable. By encouraging the enforceability of a written document, parties are urged to ponder seriously the
consequences of their actions. The integrity of the contract process
cannot be undermined when parties are held to their negotiated
agreement. After all, in an ideal context, a contract is the byproduct
of a freely negotiated process, to which each party voluntarily gives
his consent. Moreover, contracts provide that degree of legal cer184 See

id. at 829 ("If continuation of their marriage is a material term, then the
question becomes whether divorce frustrates the contract as to that term.").
185See id
186 Id. at 830.
187 See Robertson, In the Beginning, supra note 2, at 463-76 (describing
the implications of the express contract theory); Robertson, Resolving Disputes, supra note 83, at
10-12 (discussing advance agreements on disposition); Robertson, PriorAgreements,
supra note 2, at 409-11 (asking whether such directives will be enforced); Trespalacios, supra note 2, at 827-28 (noting that the IVF process could utilize express

agreements).

In See Andrews, supra note 2, at 407 (asserting that the state might mandate the

use of such agreements).

See Trespalacios, supra note 2, at 828 ("These agreements could then provide
the courts with evidence of the parties' original intentions to facilitate resolving disputes arising after IVF.").
189
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tainty and predictability necessary for the efficient operation and
management of any IVF program. What is essential, however, is that
both the infertile couple and the IVF facility must know, in advance,
whether the dispositional agreements will control.' 90
There is, however, one option available to a disgruntled party
who contests the contract's enforceability. That is, that the contract
is not the result of a voluntary process.' 9 ' The issue evolves into
whether such an agreement is in fact a contract of adhesion. 92 An
adhesion contract is one in which there is no arm's-length, give-andtake bargaining process insofar as one of the parties to the contract
was in a position to exert superior strength over the other. Where
the negotiation process is, in effect, absent or the agreement is not
the end result of a consent voluntarily given, that contract may be set
aside as not being the product of a meeting of the minds. Legal doctrines that permit the setting aside of contracts stem from the legal
postulate that where consent to contract is absent, a contract cannot
exist. Such situations may include a contract induced by fraud or duress. Unforeseen changes or unanticipated events do not, however,
negate consent and, therefore, are not necessarily grounds for setting
aside an agreement.9 There may indeed be cogent arguments of
unfairness when disposition agreements are enforced despite
changed circumstances.'9 4 According to Professor Robertson, however, the risk of unfairness does not override the advantage of certainty that accrues to infertile couples and IVF programs from the enforcement at law of such dispositional agreements."5
IW See Robertson, In the Beginning, supra note 2, at 464 ("[A]ll parties gain from
the ability to rely on prior instructions when future contingencies occur."). Advance
planning minimizes both the frequency as well as the cost of resolving disputes. See
id.
191 See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998)
(noting that the parties
did not "contest the legality of [the] agreements, or that they were freely and knowingIy made") (emphasis added).
An adhesion contract is defined as a
[s] tandardized contract form offered to consumers of goods and services on essentially 'take it or leave it' basis without affording [the] consumer realistic opportunity to bargain .... [A] [d]istinctive feature of
adhesion contract[s] [is] that [the] weaker party has no realistic
choice as to its terms.
BLAcK's LAW DIMrIONARY 25 (6th ed. 1991).
193 See Robertson, Prior Agreements, supra note 2,
at 420 ("[A]dvance agreements
for disposition raise few problems of foreseeability or changed circumstances .
).
"94

See id.

See Robertson, In the Beginning, supra note 2, at 468-69 ("The need for certainty
when entering into embryo freezing, and for preventing the burdens of parenthood
that one partner insisted on avoiding, outweighs the interest of the party who has
changed his or her mind .... ).
195
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The primary issue is whether decisions of such a personal nature
should be the subject of private contract negotiation as opposed to
state regulation based on public policy considerations. This debate
has been largely settled by case law. First, the United States Supreme
Court has held that personal decisions regarding procreative rights
are constitutionally protected and cannot become the subject of state
involvement unless the state demonstrates a compelling interest in
the matter. 96 That stage is reached when the implanted fetus is viable.'9 7 Various state cases have embraced the contract as the appropriate vehicle for the resolution and regulation of procreative rights
and obligations. In Tennessee, for example, the Davis court found
that
an agreement regarding disposition of any untransferred preembryos in the event of contingencies (such as the death of one or
more of the parties, divorce .

..

) should be presumed valid and

should be enforced as between the progenitors. This conclusion
is in keeping with the proposition that the progenitors, having
provided the gametic material giving rise to the preembryos, retain decision-making authority as to their disposition.
Moreover, the court in Kass held that "it should be the progenitors - not the state and not the courts - who by their prior directive
make this deeply personal life choice."'99 The Kass court continued
that although the consent documents were "technically provided by
the IVF program," these instruments bind the couple to each other..2
This contract between the couple and the IVF facility was "freely and
knowingly made" and was "an expression
of their own intent regard20
ing disposition of their pre-zygotes." °
D.

Progenitor'sBundle of Rights -

A BalancingTest

The fourth and final method for the disposition of decisional
authority between progenitors over the zygote or embryo rests in
what is, in effect, the measurement of the progenitor's bundle of
rights, or the measurement of the respective burdens and benefits of
196 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion in matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child."); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
197 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (noting that the "compelling
point" is at fetal viability).
198 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d
588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
19,) Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174,
180 (N.Y. 1998).
200
201

Id.

Id.
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each progenitor.0
The gamete provider's right to procreate is
weighed against the right not to procreate. The test for granting custody to one progenitor balances the merits of each party's interests. 3
This inquiry involves several factors, including the following: the positions of the parties, the significance of each party's respective interests, and "the relative burdens that will be imposed by the differing
resolutions."2 4 The default rule, according to this approach, favors
the party objecting to parenthood when the other party has a
11
reasonable possibility"
of achieving parenthood by other means. 205
Where that goal cannot be achieved inasmuch as no other reasonable alternatives for pregnancy exist, the objections of the unwilling
party will be overruled. Professor Robertson, a proponent of this approach, states that one must consider the "irreversibility of the respective losses at issue ....The party who wishes to avoid offspring is

irreversibly harmed if embryo transfer and birth occur,
for the bur20 6
dens of unwanted parenthood cannot be avoided.
The criteria for this test were outlined by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis. The analysis anticipates consideration of all
relevant facts.20 7 Each side's preference is measured against the burden that their position would impose on the opposite party.2 08

Al-

though the criteria determined by the balancing of burdens and
benefits are fixed, the measurement of these criteria is set against the
factual circumstances of each case. It should be remembered that
the Davis court applied the balancing test precisely because there was
no contract between the parties.2 Only when an enforceable contract is missing will such a test be used. Even the Davis court, which
adopted the balancing of the bundle of rights test, noted that such
0
disputes would be better resolved through contractual principles.2
202

See Robertson, In the Beginning, supra note 2, at 476-81 ("[R]esolution of such

disputes requires a close look at the competing interests of each party ....
").
Yo3 See id.
at 453 "The legal status of the fertilized egg and early embryo will thus
be determined by the balance struck among the competing interests of gamete providers, embryo protection .. ")
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603 (Tenn. 1992).
205 See id. at 604 ("[O]rdinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation
should
prevail, assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than use of the preembryos in question.").
206 Robertson, Resolving Disputes,
supra note 83, at 8.
207
See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603.
298

See id.

209

See id. at 590 (noting that there was no written agreement between the par-

ties).
210

See id. at 597 (stating that it would discuss the use of agreements to provide

necessary guidance to others utilizing IVF procedures).
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To what extent, if any, can the quantification of interests under
the balancing test acquire a subjective dimension? Has the test adequately screened for and eliminated subjective considerations?
Courts should be vigilant of applying subjective criteria because an
examination of factual circumstances might lead to such a tendency.
Differing interpretations of an identical set of facts are quite possible.
How will the balancing test measure up as new technologies emerge
in this constantly changing field?
Addressing this issue by utilizing guidelines for contractual interpretation and legal enforceability, as did the court in Kass, serves
to reinforce several objectives, including:
(1)
Respect for individual's decisions regarding intensely private matters;
(2)
Respect for the seriousness of the contract process;
(3)
Assurance of greater consistency and uniformity in contract interpretation; and,
(4)
Predictability of outcome, which allows both the prospective gamete provider and the IVF facility to anticipate the
governing rules in advance.
Of the four approaches outlined in this article, the contract approach is, for the four reasons noted above, most meritorious and
deserving of adoption by sister states.
CONCLUSION

In a culture that values both family and children, infertility is a
disease in search of a cure. Medical research and technological advances in lVF fertilization procedures have begun to roll back the toll
of this disease. In its trail, however, these miracles have also engendered legal and ethical controversies, including how to master this
medical technology and to use it in accordance not only with our cultural values, but our legal definition of family and rights of privacy.
Such a debate has surfaced with the creation through IVF of fertilized eggs, which may be stored in an IVF bank for an indefinite period of time to be implanted at a future date or perhaps never at all.
How should we allocate dispositional control over spare, frozen, or
stored embryos? It is clear that in this context, the law is playing
catch-up with established medical facts. How has the law provided
guidance and direction in an emotionally charged and ethically challenging field?
Where there is no legislation and almost no case law, the judiciary faces a daunting task. Should it choose, intentionally, to step in
and seek to extrapolate legal rules from a consensus of that culture's
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value system? Alternatively, the judiciary, as an institution, could
back off from such activism and defer to the legislature to impose legal norms.
An examination of the two principal cases, however, Kass in New
York and Davis in Tennessee, demonstrates that judges in two very
different states are willing to grapple with this assignment. Both were
eager to solicit counsel of academic commentators to distill guidelines that will offer consistency and uniformity in practice. The goal
for the judiciary, as it is for the academic scholars, is to fashion legal
norms that balance the tension between the interests of an infertile
couple and the countervailing interests of a society that seeks to preserve its value system. In this area of infertility, four separate models
have emerged for the resolution of conflict regarding dispositional
authority over frozen embryos: a contract analysis, the implied contract theory, the bundle of rights balancing test, and the criterion of
exclusive control to the biologic donors. Each of these four distinct
approaches, as discussed in this Article, deserves attention. The central issue remains, however, as to which approach will simultaneously
accommodate both the interests of the infertile couple and those of
the larger society.
For this author, the New York Court of Appeals in Kass, by
adopting the contract model as the medium for resolution of the
question of dispositional control over the embryo, has promulgated a
trail-blazing precedent. With Kass, the New York Court of Appeals
was the first court in the nation to rule that private agreements regarding embryo disposition are legal and must be enforced in a court
of law. Such a holding by New York's highest court speaks of that
state's strong commitment to procreative liberty and to freedom of
contract.

